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BY PHOEBE

C. ELLSWORTH

Few advocates of the
jury system would argue
that the average juror is
as competent a tribunal
as the average judge.
Whatever competence
the jury has is a
function of two of its
attributes:

its number
and its
interaction.
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The fact that a jury must be composed
of at least six people, with different
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives, provides protection against
decisions based on an idiosyncratic view
of the facts. In addition, the jury must be
chosen in a manner that reflects a
representative cross-section of community opinion. The jury's competence,
unlike that of the judge, rests partly on
its ability to reflect the perspectives,
experiences, and values of the ordinary
people in the community - not just the
most common or typical community
perspective, but the whole range of
viewpoints.
Representativeness is important not
only for ensuring "the essential nature of
the jury as a tribunal embodying a broad
democratic ideal," 1 but because it affects
the jury's competence directly. Failure to
assure that any given group has a fair
chance of participation "deprives the jury
of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in
any case that may be presented. "2
A jury decision, however, is more
than an average of the verdict preferences of six or twelve citizens who
represent a variety of experiences.
Ideally, the knowledge, perspectives, and
memories of the individual members are
compared and combined, and individual
errors and biases are discovered and
discarded, so that the final verdict is
forged from a shared understanding of
the case. This understanding is more
complete and more accurate than any of
the separate versions that contributed to
it, or indeed than their average. This
transcendent understanding is the
putative benefit of the deliberation
process.

HEADS

better than
If it does nothing else, group deliberation (except in extraordinarily one-sided
cases) forces people to realize that there
are different ways of interpreting the
same facts. While this rarely provokes a
prompt revision of their own views, it
necessarily reminds the jury members
that their perceptions are partly conjectural - an obvious truth, but one that is
otherwise unlikely to occur to them.
A judge does not have this vivid
reminder that alternative construals are
possible. A judge, however, has experience on the bench and training in the
law. Critics of the jury often focus on the
incompetence of people chosen as jurors,
compared to that of the judge. At best,
the venire consists of a representative
sample of the community, with a few
members having genuine expertise, a
large number who are simply average
citizens, and a few others who are
distinctly below average. In practice,
many of the better-educated jurors are
excused from service, and others who
show knowledge or ability relevant to the
particular case at trial may be challenged

during the voir dire. Attorneys sometimes
select jurors for incompetence. 3 Thus,
some have argued that the average jury is
not only less competent than the average
judge, but is also less competent than a
random sample of twelve citizens from
the community.
Historically, the debate over the
competence of juries has been less than
enlightening. In particular, there are two
conspicuous omissions.
First, there is a great reluctance to
define competent decision-making. Social
scientists who tum to the legal literature
in search of criteria by which to evaluate
the jury are likely to find it a frustrating
experience. It is extremely difficult to
design research that will contribute
useful information to the debate on
competence when the concept of competence is not defined.
Second, most of the social science
research and much of the legal debate has
focused primarily on the jury's verdict,
an extremely crude measure of competence, and one that tells us very little
about what juries actually do.
One way to look at jury functioning is
to break down the jury's task into
components, and look at the way the jury
deals with each one. Pennington and
Hastie 4 have provided a useful list:
1) The jury members must "encode"
the information they get at trial. A
competent jury must pay attention to the
testimony and remember it.
2) The jury must define the legal
categories. A competent jury should
define these categories as they are
presented in the judges' instructions.

l.

2.

3.

Ellsworth &: Getman, "Social Science in legal
Decision-Making," in Law and the Social Sciences
596 (L. Lipson&: S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972)
(plurality opinion of Marshall,]., joined by
Douglas and Stewart, Jj.)
See]. Van Dyke,]ury Selection Procedures (1977);
V. Hans&: N. Vidmar, judging the jury 63-78
(1986)
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3) The jury must select the admissible
evidence and ignore evidence that is
inadmissible.
4) The jury must construct the
sequence of events.
5) The jury must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
6) The jury must evaluate the evidence
in relation to the legal categories
provided in the instructions. That is,
certain elements of the story the jury
constructs are particularly important in
determining the appropriate verdict. The
jury must identify these elements and
understand how differences in the
interpretation of the facts translate into
differences in the appropriate verdict
choice.
7) The jury must test its interpretation
of the facts and the implied verdict
choice against the standard of proof:
preponderance of evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or beyond a
reasonable doubt.
8) The jury must decide on the
verdict.
In discussing my research on jury
deliberations, I present data and some
impressions of how the jury performs
these tasks; I also discuss some other
aspects of jury deliberation.
The research itself involved close
analysis of eighteen mock juries in the
first hour of deliberation. Because of the
small sample size, statistical analysis of
the data generally would be misguided.
The study is most usefully considered as
an intensive case study of the process of
jury deliberation. However, the fact that
there are eighteen cases rather than one
makes it considerably more useful than
the usual case study, because it allows for
some assessment of the variability of
juries exposed to the same stimulus.
A major drawback is that none of the
juries reached a verdict in the hour
allotted to them. Thus, the study is most
useful as an exploration of how juries
structure their task, how well they deal
with the facts and the law, and what
things they discuss. It is very likely that
at some point juries move into an
"endgame" that may differ substantially
from the phases preceding it.
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Ideally, the knowledge,
perspectives, and
memories of the
individual members
are compared and
combined, and
individual errors and
biases are discovered
and discarded, so that
the final verdict is
forged from a shared
understanding of
the case.

Two hundred and sixteen adults
eligible for jury service in Santa Clara or
San Mateo County, California, participated in the deliberation study and
provided usable data. Thirty-three of
them were recruited from the venire lists
of the Santa Clara County Superior Court
after completing their terms as jurors.
The remainder had responded to a
classified advertisement in local newspapers asking for volunteers for a study of
"how jurors make decisions," or were
referred by friends aware of or participating in the study. Each subject was paid
ten dollars for participation.
The sample was fairly representative
of the suburban upper-middle-class
community surrounding Stanford
University, except that males and minorities were underrepresented. The sample
was 93 percent white and 65 .3 percent
female. The average age of the subjects
was 4 3, and 63 percent of the sample was
employed outside the home. The median
educational level was slightly less than a
college degree. Finally, 46 percent of the
sample had previously performed jury
duty, while 37 percent had actually
served on juries.
Subjects watched a videotape of a
simulated homicide trial that represented
all major aspects of an actual criminal
trial. After hearing the evidence, arguments, and instructions, the jurors gave
an initial verdict. jurors were then
assigned to twelve-person juries and
allowed to deliberate for one hour.
We chose to use a videotape prepared
by Reid Hastie for use in his research on
jury unanimity. 5 This tape is representative of the procedures, setting, style, and
issues that commonly occur in actual
homicide trials. The case was complex
enough to afford several plausible
interpretations and verdict preferences.
It resembled most real murder trials in
that there was no question that the
defendant had killed the victim; rather,
the evidence centered on the precise
sequence of events preceding the killing
and on the defendant's state of mind at
the time. Finally, the tape was far more
vivid and realistic than any other simu-

lated trial materials we have encountered.
It was highly unlikely that we could have
constructed a better tape with our
resources.
Hastie's videotape is a reenactment of
an actual homicide case based on a
complete transcript of the original trial,
with a judge and experienced criminal
attorneys playing roles based on the
actual judge's instructions and lawyers'
arguments. We modified the tape in two
ways for the present research. First, we
shortened it slightly by deleting one
defense witness whose testimony added
little. Second, we replaced the segment of
the original tape containing the original
instructions, which had been based on
Massachusetts law, with a new sequence
in which the applicable California law
was given. Pretesting indicated that the
tape was regarded as convincing and
realistic.
In the trial videotape, the defendant,
Frank Johnson, is charged with firstdegree murder for the stabbing of Alan
Caldwell outside a neighborhood bar.
The prosecution brings evidence that the
defendant and victim had argued in the
bar earlier that day, and that Caldwell
had threatened the defendant with a
straight razor. Johnson had left after the
argument, but had returned with a friend
that evening. Caldwell later came into the
bar, and he and the defendant went
outside and began to argue loudly. Two
witnesses testify that they saw Johnson
stab down into Caldwell's body. The
victim's razor was subsequently found,
folded, in his left rear pocket.
For the defense, Johnson testifies that
he had returned to the bar that evening
on the invitation of his friend and had
entered only after ascertaining that
Caldwell was not there. Caldwell had
come in later and had asked Johnson to
step outside, presumably for the purpose
of patching up their quarrel. Once
outside, Caldwell had hit him and come
at him with a razor. Johnson had pulled
out a fishing knife which he often carried
in his pocket and Caldwell had run onto
the knife. In cross-examination, the
defense attorney cast doubt on the ability
of the prosecution's eye witness to see the
scuffle, and showed that medical evidence cannot establish whether the
defendant stabbed down into the victim
or whether the victim ran onto the knife.

Four verdicts are possible in this case,
depending upon the jury's findings of
facts. The defendant may be guilty of
first-degree murder, of second-degree
murder, or of voluntary manslaughter,
or he may be not guilty for reason of selfdefense or accidental homicide.
The study was conducted on weekend
afternoons at Stanford University. Each
subject group consisted of twelve to
thirty-six subjects. Upon arrival, all
subjects were given a brief overview of
the study and asked to fill out an informed consent form and a preliminary
questionnaire focusing on demographic
characteristics, general attitudes toward
the death penalty and toward criminal
defendants, and general attitudes with
respect to crime control and due process.
The experimenter then introduced the
videotape and instructed subjects to pay
close attention because afterwards, they
would be asked to deliberate to reach a
verdict based on the facts of the case and
the judge's instructions, just as if they
were actual jurors.

Deliberations
As soon as the videotape was over,
the experimenter asked the subjects to
indicate their verdict preferences on an
initial verdict questionnaire by checking
one of four choices: first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, manslaughter, or
not guilty. After collecting the questionnaires, the experimenter announced
assignments to jury panels and directed
each jury to a separate room for deliberation. These were seminar rooms
equipped with a long table and a video
camera and two ceiling microphones to
record deliberations for later analysis.
The equipment also allowed the experimenters to view the deliberations on a
monitor outside the room, in order to
detect problems that might jeopardize
the validity of the study.
Once the subjects were settled in the
jury room, the experimenter told them
that their next task was to discuss the
case and try to reach a verdict. They were
assured that their immediate
postvideotape verdict was confidential

and that they need not feel committed to
it. They were also told that most juries
begin by taking a straw vote, and that in
any case they should choose a foreman
before beginning their deliberation.
The experimenter continued as follows:
As you discuss the case, it is
important to put yourselves into the
role of jurors. Imagine that you are a
real jury and that your verdict will
actually determine the fate of the
defendant you saw on the tape. We
want you to make your decision only
on the basis of what you saw on the
tape. Although the characters in the
trial you saw were actors, we want.you
to treat them as if they were real. In
short, we want you to make the
decision you would make if you were a
real jury and if you had seen in court
exactly what you saw on the tape.
The experimenter closed by informing
the subjects that they had one hour in
which to deliberate, and that they should
try to reach a decision in that time,
although quite possibly one hour would
not be long enough to reach a consensus.
The purpose of this instruction was
simply to assure that the subjects worked
on their deliberation seriously and tried
to reconcile their differences of opinion.
We did not ask them to take a vote at the
end of the hour, and we did not expect
them to reach a verdict.
Subjects were then left to discuss the
case. Although they appeared to be
slightly self-conscious in the presence of
the recording equipment for the first
minute or two, the jurors became highly
involved in the discussion and seemed to
forget about the camera as soon as the
deliberations revealed disagreements

4.

5.

Pennington &: Hastie, "juror Decision Making
Models: The Generalization Gap," 89
Psychological Bulletin 246, 249-55 (1981).
R. Hastie, S. Penrod,&: N. Pennington,
Inside the jury (1983).

LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES

SUMMER

1995 59

among the members, which occurred
almost immediately for each jury. After
an hour the experimenter returned,
stopped the deliberation, and handed out
the postexperiment questionnaires.
The videotaped jury deliberations
were transcribed, and the transcripts
were divided into units. In devising the
coding scheme, I identified thirty major
issues in the case. A unit, by definition,
could contain no more than one of these
issues. Short utterances occasionally
contained none; long utterances were
divided into units corresponding to the
number of issues. Each transcript was
coded by one or more of three trained
coders. Coders were given lists of 100
case facts, 18 major issues, and 60 legal
instructions; at various points, two
coders were asked to code the same jury
in order to calculate inter-coder reliability. Each unit was coded for the general
nature of the statement (issue, fact, law,
vote, procedural comment, and so on),
correctness, pro defense or pro prosecution position, and the particular fact,
issue, or point of law that was mentioned. Coders met weekly with me to
resolve questions and settle differences.

Choosing a foreman
All juries began by choosing a foreman, not surprisingly, since the experimenter had instructed them to do so.
The foreman was always chosen very
quickly, with a minimum of discussion.
The process of foreman selection can
be summed up by the phrase "choose a
man who says he has experience."

6. This gender bias in choice of a foreperson has
changed little over the last forty years. See
Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, "Social Status in
Jury Deliberations," 22 Amer. Soc. Rev. 713
(1957). It occurs not only in mock jury research
but in real trials. See Kerr, Harmon & Graves,
"Independence of Multiple Verdicts by Jurors
and Juries," 12]. Applied Soc. Psychology 12,
24-25 (1982); Note, "Gender Dynamics and Jury
Deliberations," 96Yale Law journal 593 (1987).
7. See Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, supra note 5;
see also Hawkins, "Interaction Rates of Jurors
Aligned in Factions," 27 Am. Soc. Rev. 689
(1962).
8. See H. Kalven & H. Zeise!, The American jury
486 (1966).
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Although 65 percent of the jurors were
female, sixteen of the eighteen foremen
were male. 6 On the jury composed of
eleven women and one man, the man
was chosen. When the jurors had arrived
in the room and settled in their seats,
someone would point out that their first
job was to chose a foreman, and then
typically someone would ask, "Has
anybody had any experience with this
sort of thing?" A man would claim
experience, and the other jurors would
agree that he should take the job.
Occasionally two men would claim
experience and a brief "after you,
Alphonse" discussion would ensue until
one of them said, "all right, I'll do it."
These two scenarios account for foreman
selection in ten of the eighteen juries.
Since we knew which of our subjects
had actually served on real juries, we
were able to find out whether the people
chosen as foreman were actually more
likely to have had prior jury experience
than the other jurors. They were not
more experienced: 39 percent of the
foremen had served on juries, as compared with 36 percent of the other jurors,
an insignificant difference. Thus, a
foreman is someone who claims experience, not necessarily someone who has it.
On the remaining eight juries, five
foremen (four male, one female) were
chosen because they were sitting in one
of the seats on the ends of the table, and
three (two male, one female) were
individuals who had opened the discussion by volunteering for the position.
Altogether, nine of the foremen were
sitting at the head of the table, and four
others were sitting in the chair right next
to the head. Table position is by no
means a subtle proxemic cue that exerts
an unconscious influence on the jurors;
in the majority of cases the jurors
explicitly gave table position as their
reason for their choice - "you should do
it, you're sitting in the right place."
These data suggest that jurors give
little consideration to their selection of
foremen. They are generally given no
information on what qualifications to
look for, so they have little to guide them
but their background knowledge and
stereotypes of the jury, gained from the
media and other sources. In the movies,
the foreman sits at the head of the table.

In addition, at the time that the
foreman is chosen, most jurors may still
regard their task as a relatively simple
one, because the extent of disagreement
on the jury has not yet been revealed.
They may not think it makes much
difference who is chosen foreman,
because they see the case as straightforward and do not anticipate serious
disputes. Finally, since no disagreements
have yet been revealed, it is likely that
strong norms of courtesy prevail at the
time that the foreman is selected. Once
someone has been suggested, the others
may think it is impolite to question his or
her ability.

Taking the task seriously
Once the foreman was selected, the
juries took one of two approaches to
their task. One-half of the juries began by
taking a vote, roughly evenly divided
among show-of-hands, secret ballot, and
a go-around procedure in which each
juror states a position and says a little
about his or her reasons for taking that
position. The other half of the juries
began by discussing the facts and issues
in the case. The judge's instructions
contained a caution to the jurors not to
become unduly committed to their
position but to remain open-minded.
A few jurors interpreted these instructions to mean that they should not begin
deliberations with a vote.
Hastie and his colleagues7 have
proposed that when a jury postpones a
formal vote, it is freer to raise issues and
discuss them open-mindedly. When a
jury begins by voting, people feel committed to the position they have publicly
expressed, and spend their time defending their position rather than trying to
understand the facts and the law. Our
data generally support Hastie's findings .
juries that postponed voting spent more
time talking about the important issues in
the case, and brought out more facts .
One might hypothesize that juries that
voted early would spend more time
discussing the relevant law, because they

would need to define the legal verdict
categories before they could vote. This,
however, was not the case. Early versus
late voting did not predict the amount of
time spent discussing the law.
Whether or not a jury began by
voting, it was quickly apparent to
members of the jury that they disagreed
about the appropriate verdict. As soon as
these disagreements emerged, the
character of the deliberation changed.
During foreman selection there was an
atmosphere of convivality in the jury
room, along with some degree of selfconsciousness. A few jurors joked about
the videotape camera. Once the discussion or an early vote revealed differences
of opinion, there were no more references to the camera and few jokes of any
sort. They kept their attention focused on
the case.
On the average, 4 7 percent of their
utterances concerned the facts of the
case; 32 percent addressed the important
contested issues (for example, the
defendant's state of mind, provocation,
angle of the knife thrust, ability of
witnesses to see the crime); 21 percent
dealt with the law and the judge's
instructions; and 7 percent were votes or
discussions about calling for a vote.
(A given utterance could involve both a
fact and an issue, or a fact and a point of
law, so the percentages do not add to
100 percent.) These proportions are quite
comparable to those found by Hastie and
colleagues, whose juries saw the same
case but deliberated to a final verdict.
The criticism that juries approach their
task in a frivolous manner receives no
support from this study or from any
other serious empirical research on
the jury.

When a jury
begins by voting,
people feel
committed to the
position they have
publicly expressed,
and spend their
time defending

Discussing facts and issues
Whether or not the jury began with a
vote, the general progression of the
deliberation moved from an emphasis on
facts toward an emphasis on law. In
juries that did not begin by voting, the
initial discussion resembled a random
walk through the facts and issues. A topic
would be raised, discussed briefly, and
replaced by a totally different topic, with
little attempt to organize the discussion
and no attempt to resolve the issues.

their position rather
than trying to
understand the facts
and the law.

These juries conformed very closely to
Kalven and Zeisel's observation that "the
talk moves in small bursts of coherence,
shifting from topic to topic with remarkable flexibility. It touches an issue, leaves
it, and returns again." 8 During the hour
of deliberation, the important facts and
issues would come up again and again,
while trivial issues would be dropped,
and new issues added. Typically, as an
issue was examined and re-examined,
there would be movement toward
consensus.For example, one of the most
important pieces of evidence in the trial
was the coroner's statement that he found
the victim's razor folded up in his back
left pocket. Had the victim been coming
at the defendant with the razor, a selfdefense scenario would have been very
plausible. The defendant and his friend
claimed to have seen the razor drawn;
two other witnesses testified that they did
not see the razor. Most juries raised this
issue early and dropped it without fully
considering the implications.
In subsequent discussions, someone
would raise the possibility that the victim
somehow, in a reflex-like action, could
have folded up the razor and pocketed it
after he was stabbed, or that someone
else (the policeman, the ambulance
doctor, or a passer-by) might have picked
it up and put it in the dead man's pocket.
The jury would eventually conclude that
these possibilities were farfetched, and
agree that the victim never pulled the
razor during the fatal confrontation. As a
consequence, some juries would reject
the possibility of self-defense and a few
would tum their attention to the relevant
question of the defendant's possible belief
that the razor was drawn. In general, over
the course of deliberation, jurors appear
to focus more on the important facts and
issues, come to a clearer understanding
of them, and approach consensus on the
facts.
In juries that began with a vote, the
discussion tended to be slightly more
organized. The average distribution of
verdicts prior to deliberation was one for
first-degree murder, two for seconddegree murder, six for manslaughter, and
two for not guilty. Although none of the
juries showed exactly this pattern, most
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of them had a majority of votes in the
two middle categories with outliers for
not guilty or for both not guilty and firstdegree murder. A common tactic was for
the middle jurors to begin by asking the
outliers to explain their deviant position,
typically starting with the proponents of
first-degree murder. Whether or not the
jury began with a vote, however, issues
were raised and dropped fairly
unsystematically, then raised again;
slowly, progress was made. Little by
little, most juries resolved the issues of
fact and spent an increasing proportion
of their time on the central issue: the
defendant's state of mind.

Dealing with the facts
Kalven and Zeisel conclude that "the
jury does by and large understand the
facts and get the case straight. " 9 On the
whole, the data from this study support
that conclusion. The juries in our study
spent more time discussing the facts of
the case (4 7 percent of the units included
references to facts brought out in testimony) than anything else. These were
rarely purely factual statements. Most of
the time facts were raised in connection
with a contested issue, a reference to
common sense or knowledge , a hypothetical scenario, or a reference to the
law.
Most of the juries managed to sort out
the factual issues fairly well during the
process of deliberation. Conflicting
testimony (for example, about the angle
of the knife thrust) was recognized as
such, so that juries ended up correctly
attributing different versions of the story
to different witnesses. Questions regarding the distance and angle of vision of the
various witnesses were generally resolved
correctly, and errors of fact generally
were corrected. None of the juries
maintained an erroneous perception of
an important fact after the hour of
deliberation. Implausible suggestions
generally were discussed and rejected, as
9.
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in the case of someone putting the razor
in the victim's pocket after he was
stabbed.
Jurors tended to focus on testimony
that favored their initial verdict preferences: Testimony about the previous
confrontation between the two men was
generally raised by jurors who favored a
murder verdict, whereas testimony that
the victim punched the defendant
immediately before the killing was
generally raised by jurors who favored
manslaughter or self-defense. This
tendency is not a weakness, but rather a
benefit of the deliberation process the opportunity it affords for comparing
several different interpretations of the
events along with the supporting factual
evidence.
For most of the juries in this study,
discussion of the facts and issues dominated the first part of the hour. Among
the juries that voted early, there was
usually some discussion of the judge's
instructions in order to arrive at the
verdict categories, but the discussion was
generally quite superficial. During the
course of the factual discussions, the
central issues of disagreement emerged,
and jurors attempted to persuade each
other. Agreement on the facts, however,
did not lead to substantial agreement on
the central issue of the case: the
defendant's state of mind. Jurors tried to
persuade each other that their construals
of the facts made sense. The discussions
often became heated, few opinions were
changed, and at some point (often, but
not necessarily in connection with a
vote), the jurors would tum to the legal
definitions of the verdict choices for
guidance.

Dealing with the law
Juries worked hard to understand the
law. They spent an average of 21 percent
of their time discussing the judge's
instructions. Following the hour of
deliberation, jurors were given an
eighteen-question true-false test on
elements of the judge's instructions. On
average, the jurors answered 11 .7 of the
questions correctly, a result not significantly different from random guessing.
On a postdeliberation multiple-choice

test of factual issues, however, jurors
performed quite well, answering correctly
an average of 8.8 out of 14 questions
(since there were four response alternatives, 3.5 correct answers would be
expected by chance) . These results
suggest that the deliberation process
works well in correcting errors of fact but
not in correcting errors of law.
An examination of the statements
jurors made about the law during the
course of their deliberations provides
further gloomy detail. We coded all
statements jurors made about the law as
correct, incorrect, or unclear. Remarks
were coded as correct even if they were
incomplete. For example, the statement
"first-degree murder involves premeditation" would be scored as correct. Statements were scored as incorrect if they
were unambiguously wrong; for example,
"second-degree murder involves premeditation."
Statements that were coded as unclear
were usually statements about verdictevidence relationships; for example,
"If Johnson knew that Caldwell would be
there, it's premeditation." While this
statement is technically false, because
returning to a bar knowing that one's
enemy is there does not necessarily imply
intent to kill, it was scored as unclear,
because the juror could have meant that
Johnson's knowledge was a relevant
consideration in determining premeditation. Thus, we did not code statements as
incorrect unless there was no plausibly
correct construal.
Given this rather lenient coding, we
found that only half of the references to
the law (631) were accurate, even when
credit was given for partial accuracy.
We found that 609 were not correct
(28 percent unclear; 21 percent definitely
incorrect) . Whereas factual errors tended
to be corrected during deliberation,
errors of law were not corrected. Considering instances where the jury changed
its position, 52 percent of them involved
replacing an erroneous response with a
correct one, and 48 percent involved
replacing a correct response with an
erroneous one.

These results are quite distressing,
since they mean that the jury does not
recognize the right answer when it hears
it. Juries who have heard the right
definition are as likely to reject it as juries
who have heard the wrong one. The jury
as a whole does not profit from the
abilities of its best members when it
comes to questions of law.
During the course of deliberation,
jurors generally fought to defend their
correct opinions of the facts but not their
correct versions of the legal standards.
Typically the most forcefully expressed
position prevailed, whether or not it was
correct. Most of the jurors' discussions of
substantive law (that is, the definitions of
the verdict categories) conveyed an
impression of considerable uncertainty
("Was it ... I think it was something
about passion?"), and jurors who seemed
confident about the law were often
believed, whether or not their statements
corresponded to the judge's instructions.
Of the 1, 752 units across all juries that
referred to the law, only seventy-five
(4 percent) were error corrections.
Only 12 percent of the 609 incorrect and
unclear statements were corrected. Only
10 percent of the 1,285 references to the
verdict choices addressed the distinctions
between them. Of these, 26 percent were
correct statements, 11 percent were
definitely incorrect, 42 percent were
unclear, and 21 percent were questions.
Examining each jury's last definition of
the four verdict choices during the course
of the hour, we found that no jury was
correct on all four of them. It appears
that most jurors failed to absorb a great
many of the judge's instructions and that
the process of deliberation did not
correct this problem.
Further evidence that the jurors
learned less than they should have from
the judge's instructions comes from
examinating the frequency with which
different aspects of the law were discussed during deliberation. The instructions most often discussed involved
points of law that the jurors were very
likely to have heard about before they
heard the case; thus, there is a strong
possibility that much of their discussion

of the law was based not on the instructions they had heard from the judge but
on prior knowledge.
For example, the element of the
judge's instructions discussed most
frequently was the definition of firstdegree murder requiring premeditation
and deliberation. Jurors were usually
correct in their definitions (sixty-five
correct statements, five incorrect, thirtyseven unclear). They very rarely went any
further, however, in trying to define firstdegree murder. There were only thirteen
mentions of the definition of premeditation
and deliberation, and only thirty-eight
attempts to distinguish first-degree from
second-degree murder (eight correct, four
incorrect, twenty unclear, four questions,
and two error corrections).
These results suggest that much of the
jurors' discussion of the law on firstdegree murder may have been based on
the well-known phrase "premeditation
and deliberation," and did not benefit
from the new information provided by
the judge's instructions. In addition, one
might argue that the disproportionate
amount of time spent discussing premeditation was inappropriate in this case,
since fewer jurors favored first-degree
murder than any other verdict choice.
Likewise, the familiar phrase "heat of
passion" was the most commonly
discussed element of manslaughter and
accounted for 125 units, of which a third
were incorrect or unclear statements.
Interestingly, "involuntary manslaughter"
was raised in ninety-three units, of which
fifty-one were clearly incorrect. It is not
surprising that most of the references
were incorrect, since the judge had stated
that the verdict category "involuntary
manslaughter" was not relevant to this
case. The fact that "involuntary manslaughter" was discussed almost as much
as "heat of passion" in relation to the
manslaughter verdict provides further
evidence that juries rely at least as much
on legal knowledge gained outside the
courtroom as they do on the judge's
instructions.
Although most of the law discussed by
the jurors involved the substance of the
verdict categories, jurors devoted 7
percent of their discussion of the law to
the reasonable doubt standard, and 10
percent to the judge's instructions about
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the jurors' duties. The juries' understanding of reasonable doubt and how they
must rule in the face of reasonable doubt
was extremely accurate. Not one person
on any jury, however, raised the question
of the definition of reasonable doubt.
Like "premeditated murder," the
phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is one
that is likely to be familiar to jurors from
prior experience, so we cannot conclude
that they learned this standard from the
judge's instructions. Attempts to apply the
reasonable doubt standard to the facts of
the case were evenly divided between
correct and incorrect/unclear applications.
The reasonable doubt standard was almost
always raised by jurors who were trying to
persuade a harsher faction to move toward
their position.
Procedural instructions were also used
as arguing tactics. Of the 172 remarks
made about jurors' duties, 114 were
devoted to three of the eleven
instructions given by the judge: that
jurors should only be influenced by the
evidence and law presented in court
(forty-nine remarks); that jurors ~hould
not speculate about sustained obJecnons
(twenty-two); and that jurors should not
consider the penalty or consequences of
the verdict (forty-three).
These comments were also used
primarily as a weapon to close off ~ines of
argument that a juror disagreed with, and
generally took the form, "We can't
speculate about that," or "We're not .
allowed to consider that." Jurors applied
these rules incorrectly thirty-nine times
and were clearly incorrect forty-five
times; only fifteen of these forty-five
errors were corrected. A great deal of
concern has been expressed about jurors'
inability to disregard extra-evidentiary
factors; our data suggest that this concern
is appropriate. However, j~rors may also
use the judge's cautionary mstruct10ns to
stifle discussion of unpalatable, but
clearly relevant, evidence.
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Conclusion
In summary, the process of
deliberation seems to work quite well in
bringing out the facts and arriving at a
consensus about their sequence. Errors
are corrected, and irrelevant facts and
implausible scenarios are generally
weeded out, at least in deliberations over
this relatively simple homicide. The
juries also do a good job of gradually
narrowing down discussion to the
important issues. On the whole,
however, the discussion of the facts does
not produce changes in votes, since
jurors' verdict preferences in the c~se
were rarely a function of a clear mistake
on the facts.
Unfortunately, the jurors' understanding of the law was substantially inferior
to their understanding of the facts and
issues.The judge's instructions were not
very effective in educating them in n~w
areas, or even in focusing their attent10n
on the meaning of the familiar terms.
This failure to applY.. the law correctly was
by no means a failure to take the law
seriously. Discussions of the law took up
one-fifth of the deliberation time and
were carried out with great intensity,
frequently with an apparent sense of
frustration. The jurors understood that a
key aspect of their task was to interp~et
the evidence in terms of the appropnate
legal categories. They struggled to do so,
but often failed.
There is no reason to believe that the
jurors' misunderstanding of ~e. law is a
function of their mental capac1nes. It seems
more plausible that the system is set up to
promote misunderstanding. F~ctors
blockading the serious JUry trymg to
perform its task include: the convoluted,
technical language; the dry and abstract
presentation of the law following the vivid,
concrete, and often lengthy presentation of
evidence; the requirement that jurors
interpret the evidence before they know
what their verdict choices are; the fact that
juries usually do not get copies. of the .
instructions to take with them mto the JUry
room; the lack of training in the law for
jurors as part of their jury dut~; the ~eneral
failure to discover and correct JUrors

preconceptions about the law; the failure
to inform jurors that they are allowed to
ask for help with the instructions; and the
fact that those who do ask for help are
often disappointed by a simple repetition
of the incomprehensible paragraph.
Research on jurors' comprehension of
judge's instructions is increasing, but there
is still very little. We do not even know
whether juries that ask for help with the
instructions do better than juries that try to
muddle through on their own. Research on
specific techniques for improving juror
comprehension indicates that improvement is possible. At any rate, it seems
profoundly unfair to criticize juries for
failing to perform well a task that, by all
the usual educational criteria, has been
stacked against them.
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